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nor the United States has sited a new radioactive waste 
management facility i n  more than two decades, despite the continuous generation 
of new waste and the paucity of reliable disposal capacity. Both nations have stirred 
u p  considerable political controversy in attempting to site such facilities, with 
aggressive local collective action consistently blocking proposals. Building on 
provincial experience in gaining public support for hazardous waste facility siting 
tlirough a voluntary, comprehensive process, both Ontario and Nebraska Show signs 
of devi~t ing  from the classic Not-in-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) response for low-level 
radioactive waste. Through a variation of the process used successfully in Alberta 
and Manitoba for hazardous waste, Ontario and Nebraska have demonstrated the 
potential applicability of these alternative siting principles for radioactive waste. 
Soi t i r imiw : Ni I t  Canada, ni les Etats-Unis n’ont construit de  nouvelles installations 
de  gestion des dechets radioactifs depuis plus de  deux dkcennies, malgr6 la produc- 
tion continuelie d e  d6chets supplbmentaires et malgri. la faible capacitb d’blimination 
fiable. Les deux nations ont dkclenche des controverses politiques considkrables en 
essayant d e  niettre en place de  telles installations, et leurs propositions ont kt6 
bloquees systkmatiquement et agressivement par les col1ectiviti.s locales. Forts de  
certaines expkriences provinciales pour gagiier le soutien du public ewers  l’emplace- 
ment d’une installation de dechets dangereux g r k c  B uii processus volontaire et 
extensif, I‘Ontario et le Nebraska semblent &vier de  la &action classique cc pas dans 
ma cow ’’ en ce qui concerne les dbchets faiblement radioactifs. Par I’entremise d’une 
variante du processus utilisb avec succes pour les dkchets dnngereux en Alberta et 
nu Manitoba, I’Ontario et le Nebraska ont dkmontre qu’on pourrait 6ventuellement 
appliqucr ces principes de  rechanpe pour l’emplacement des installations traitant les 
dkhe t s  radioactifs. 
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ALTERNATIVES TO NIMBY GRIDLOCK 
Waste management and the siting of waste disposal facilities remain among 
the most controversial environmental issues in both Canada and the United 
States. Both nations continue to generate substantial quantities of solid, 
biomedical, hazardous, and radioactive wastes and have experienced consid- 
erable difficulty in finding politically and technically suitable areas for 
opening new treatment or disposal facilities. Indeed, in most areas of waste 
management in both nations, the siting process has regularly ground to a 
halt. Consistent across varied provinces and states, the announcement of a 
siting decision quickly meets an outraged public reaction, the so-called Not- 
in-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) syndrome. Time and again, proposed facilities are 
thwarted as either governmental or private sector proponents back off in the 
face of such forceful opposition. 
The NIMBY syndrome has produced a mixed set of outcomes for effective 
waste management. On the one hand, many poorly conceived siting efforts 
have been rejected and the growing inability to open new waste treatment 
or disposal capacity has prodded governments and waste generators into 
placing greater emphasis on waste reduction and recycling efforts. At the 
same time, however, even if the most ambitious current goals for reduction 
and recycling in Canada and the United States are realized, huge quantities 
of diverse types of waste require safe treatment and disposal methods. The 
inability to open new facilities means than new, safer technologies are not 
being employed, leaving the bulk of the waste management burden on 
older, less sophisticated technologies and, increasingly, waste storage at the 
site of generation. These ramifications of NIMBY politics are cause for 
considerable concern and suggest the need for at least some addition of 
waste management capacity, particularly in those regions - or for those 
wastes - where current methods are suspect at  best. 
As a result, governments in both Canada and the United States need to 
revisit tlie issue of how they pursue siting. To date, both nations have 
tended to rely almost exclusively on top-down processes of site selection. 
Under these approaches, either governmental officials or private waste 
management firms use varying criteria to select their preferred site. In both 
instances, tlie site evaluation process takes place in tlie absence of public 
consultation or any larger strategy to distribute on an equitable basis the 
burden for waste management across a province, state, or region. As a 
result, siting decisions, once revealed, seem coercive and unfair to the 
proposed host communities, who feel they have been unjustly targeted to 
bear the sole burden for waste disposal. Consequently they take effective 
collective action through NIMBY-type protest. 
The most impressive exception to this pattern of siting gridlock stems 
from a series of cases in hazardous waste in the 1980s. The first, and per- 
haps most prominent, of these involved mid-decade efforts by the province 
of Alberta to open a comprehensive facility for all hazardous waste generat- 
ed in the province and develop an integrated province-wide system of 
645 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA 
BARRY G. RABE, WILLIAM C. CUNDERSON, PETER T. FIARBAGE 
transportation, storage, reduction, and recycling. An extensive public 
education process preceded any efforts to consider specific sites and provin- 
cial authorities made clear that siting would only be considered among 
communities that formally volunteered after extensive study. This process, 
combined with a series of related innovations, culminated in the emergence 
of multiple volunteers and the eventual opening of a comprehensive waste 
management facility in Swan Hills in 1987.’ This approach has been suc- 
cessfully replicated for hazardous waste in Manitoba and has begun to be 
adopted for hazardous waste in American states such as Minnesota and 
North Carolina, with generally encouraging results. Nonetheless, a volun- 
tary approach to siting and waste management remain the exception for 
most types of wastes in most provinces and states. 
A central concern of this article is the more general applicability of the 
“Alberta approach” to other areas of siting and waste management. This 
article examines the politics of attempting to site facilities for low-level 
radioactive waste in Canada and the United States. I t  reviews historic 
patterns of conflict - traditional top-down siting approaches that result in 
familiar gridlock - but also considers more recent efforts, in Ontario and 
Nebraska, to learn from the Alberta experience and devise a voluntary, 
comprehensive approach to the problem of siting and waste management. 
The following case analyses suggest that this approach is no sure elixir for 
cooperation, but continues to appear far more promising than prevailing 
approaches and warrants further testing and development. 
The case of low-level radioactive waste 
Few cases could provide as tough a test of the replicability of the Alberta 
approach as low-level radioactive wastes. Whereas solid wastes pose certain 
environmental risks, neither they nor most hazardous or biomedical wastes 
pose a proven risk to both human health and the environment through 
cuntdmiiiatioIi comparable to radioactive wastes. Indeed, in both Canada 
and the United States, the siting of facilities for either high-level or low-level 
radioactive wastes has been extremely controversial. The radioactive waste 
issue has probably triggered more political conflict over siting than 
hazardous waste. Consequently neither Canada nor the United States has 
opened a new storage or disposal facility for either high- or low-level waste 
in inore than twenty years.’ Meanwhile, the waste continues to be 
generated, either being stored on site or shipped to one of the few 
i Barry C,. Rabt., “Hevond the NI!dDY Syndrc)mc in Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: The 
Alhertan Breakthrough and  the I’rospects for Cooperation in Canada a n d  the United States,” 
( ; o i w i w r i r r ;  AJZ I~ i t rr i r i i f io i~al  ]orrrtiril of Policy nrrd Adi~iiri isf~nfiorr 4, no. 2 (April 1991 ), pp. 184-206. 
2 For an excellent overview o f  the American case, see Mary I<. English, Sitiiig Lozci-l.c7icl 
K17dmc*tii1~ Wmfr Disposd Fnci1ifit.c: The P ~ r l d i c .  IJoli(y D i l m m ( i  (New York: Quorum, 1992). There 
is 110 scliolarship of comparable depth mi the Canadian case. 
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remaining waste disposal facilities that were opened before this aspect of 
waste disposal became so controversial. 
Whereas high-level radioactive waste siting remains deadlocked in both 
nations, there are some promising possibilities for cooperation in low-level 
waste siting, particularly in the province of Ontario, which otherwise has 
experienced classic Nimbyism in both hazardous waste and solid waste 
facility siting3 What makes the Ontario case especially interesting is that, 
contrary to virtually all prior low-level radioactive waste siting experience 
in Canada and the United States, multiple communities have voluntarily 
and actively been exploring the possibility of hosting a facility. Moreover, 
they have agreed to do so through a process that draws heavily on the 
approach to siting initiated in Alberta in the 1980s. As we shall see, this case 
indicates that the voluntary approach to siting may indeed have replication 
prospects beyond the area of hazardous waste facility siting. This case, as 
well as important cases from the American siting experience, will be 
examined in depth, after a brief introduction to the basic history and 
evolution of low-level radioactive waste policy in the respective nations. 
Early stages of low-level radioactive 
waste management in Canada and the 
United States 
The technical and political dimensions of low-level radioactive waste man- 
agement are quite similar in Canada and the United States, perhaps more 
so than they are for hazardous waste. Both federal governments played a 
fundamental role in endorsing and subsidizing the nuclear power industry 
in the decades following the Second World War. Despite tendencies towards 
regulatory decentralization in both nations, particularly Canada, both federal 
governments have assumed central responsibility for radioactive waste 
management. These governments continue to play a far more central role 
in virtually every aspect of radioactive waste regulation and management 
than they do for hazardous, biomedical, or solid wastes. However, both 
governments have delegated somewhat more authority to provinces or 
states in this area in recent years, although this trend has clearly advanced 
more rapidly in the United States than in Canada: 
Canada and the United States also tend to speak much the same technical 
language concerning nuclear power and radioactive waste. The Canadian 
3 Doug Macdonald, The Politics of Polhtion: Why Canadians Are Failing Their Environment 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991), ch. 14. 
4 This pattern is, of course, at variance with the general Canadian tendency to pursue more 
decentralized environmental regulatory policy than the United States. See Grace Skogstad and 
Paul Kopas, ”Environmental Policy in a Federal System: Ottawa and the Provinces,” in Canadi- 
an Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics and Process, ed. Robert Boardman (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 43-59. 
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nuclear industry continues to promote actively its compact Candu 3 nuclear 
reactor in the United States.' Moreover, waste definitions and classification 
sclit-me5 are similar and the technological options for waste reduction and 
disposal are largely identical. Perhaps most important, both nations have 
experienced strikingly similar patterns of conflict for radioactive waste 
facility siting. The seemingly intractable conflicts so evident in the American 
low-level radioactive waste cases closely resemble the nation's pattern of 
ha7ardous waste facility siting. In turn, the Canadian approach to low-level 
radioactive waste facility siting until 1986 was in many respects a carbon 
copy of the approach - leading to NIMBY results - that continues to be used 
i n  manv individual states and multi-state compacts. 
The major sources of commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) in 
both nations include nuclear power plants, biomedical and industrial 
research, and non-military governmental projects. The most common source, 
of course, remains nuclear power plants, many of which were opened in the 
1960s and are beginning to approach the end of their functioning capacity. 
When such plants are closed, as appears inevitable for aging facilities in 
future decades, they no longer will generate new LLRW. At this stage, 
however, they must be decommissioned and decontaminated, which will 
create an entirely new - and potentially massive - type of LLRW disposal 
problem. In general, LLRw in both nations consists of materials contaminated 
with small amounts of radioactive substances, such as clothing, packaging, 
animal carcasses, medical fluids, and power reactor liquids. Such wastes 
need to be isolated from humans for between sixty and three hundred 
vears. In contrast, high-level radioactive wastes include both the solid spent 
fuel from nuclear reactors and the concentrated fission products left in 
liquid form after spent fuel has been chemically reprocessed to retrieve 
plutonium and unfissioned uranium. 
In the United States, the Pacific and Atlantic oceans served as repositories 
for LLRW during its first three decades of generation. Commercial land 
disposal of these wastes began in the early 1960s, with the opening of six 
facilities, all of which used shallow land burial technology. This approach 
was fairly primitive, burying waste in shallow trenches and often storing 
waste in cardboard boxes until the burial was completed. However, three of 
these facilities were closed during the 1970s due to evidence of leakage and 
other forms of contamination. The three remaining facilities, located in 
Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina, have begun to approach the end 
of  their anticipated operational lives, with the Beatty, Nevada, facility having 
closed 111 January 1993. This facility shortage has triggered new legislation, 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and its 1985 arnend- 
4 John  Urquliart, "Canadian Nuclear Industry Expects Orders t o  Rise, Plans Compact Reactor 
for U.S.," WIIII Sftw! jorrrrml (10 February 19901, p. 86. 
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ments. These turned considerable siting authority over to the states and set 
up a complex system of incentives and timetables whereby states would 
assume responsibility for their wastes6 However, most states or compacts 
have employed traditional, top-down siting strategies, and not a single new 
facility has opened in the period following enactment of the new legislation. 
In Canada, the Canadian Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the basic 
framework for radioactive waste which endures to this day. It created the 
Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), which retains authority for licensing 
and regulating the nuclear industry, including waste storage and disposal. 
It is distinct from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), which is 
responsible for federal research and development related to nuclear energy, 
and Ontario Hydro, a major provincial public corporation, which is 
responsible for management of that province’s nuclear power plants. The 
AECB does share regulatory authority in the sense that it typically confers in 
a “working group” process with related federal and provincial agencies. 
Provincial involvement is a particular concern in that Canadian LLRW is 
overwhelmingly concentrated within its largest province. Sixteen of the 
nation’s eighteen nuclear power plants are located in Ontario and, by all 
available measures, well over 90 per cent of Canada’s LLRW is generated 
within this single province, forcing the federal government to be sensitive 
to provincial concerns. 
Contrary to the American approach of ocean dumping and later commer- 
cial facility development, Canada has generally favoured a quiet, de facto 
approach to LLRW, encouraging storage and disposal at or near the sites 
where the waste is generated. Most nuclear power plants keep such wastes 
on site under “interim storage” provisions, as some American plants are 
beginning to do as disposal options narrow. In Canada, however, it is expect- 
ed that many of these wastes will eventually be shipped to one or more 
permanent facilities. In turn, wastes generated from the use of radioisotopes 
sold by the AECL Commercial Products Division must be returned for burial 
at the AECL Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories in central Ontario. Finally, 
perhaps the most controversial disposal sites are located in and around the 
town of Port Hope, which has become a rough radioactive waste counterpart 
to the American Love Canal episode with hazardous wastes. Indeed, it was 
the controversy surrounding the Port Hope case that put the radioactive 
waste disposal issue on the Canadian political agenda more than fifteen years 
ago and triggered a search for more effective siting and disposal methods. 
The evolution of Canadian LLRW 
management 
The problem of radioactive waste disposal at Port Hope actually preceded 
6 English, Siting Lour-Leriel Rudioacfive Wnste Disposal Facilities. 
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the formation of the AECB and the development of the nuclear power indus- 
try by more than a decade. Wastes generated by various domestic and 
military activities were deposited at several sites within the town of Port 
Hope from 1933 to 1948. Some of these wastes were transferred to nearby 
locations, including Welcome and Port Granby, in later years. However, it 
was not until 1975 that extensive radioactive contamination was discovered 
in Port Hope. This contamination, most of it in the form of radioactive soil, 
had been widely dispersed around the community. Radioactive waste had 
been deposited in the Port Hope harbour and a number of buildings in the 
town were constructed with contaminated material. 
After the AECB completed a series of remedial actions in Port Hope and 
other contaminated areas, in 1980 it asked Eldorado Resources Limited, a 
federal crown corporation now known as CAMECO, to begin work on the 
design and siting of advanced LLRW disposal facilities7 However, 
Eldorado’s approach to siting in many ways resembled the pattern of 
Ontario’s approach to liazardous waste facility siting and of troubled LLRW 
compact states such as Connecticut, New York, and Michigan, among 
others. Without any public consultation, Eldorado began the process of 
examining alternative sites, using various technical criteria to assess the 
suitability of each potential area. In August 1980 authorities announced that 
Eldorado ”had taken options on two properties in the Port Hope area” and 
that they intended to complete surficial geological assessment on both sites 
before selecting one. 
Typical of regulatory approaches to siting, the first opportunities for 
public participation were to be delayed until after these announcements, 
confined to the federal environmental impact assessment process. An 
assessment panel was appointed and received the formal site proposal and 
an environmental impact statement. This material was also made available 
t o  the public and local ”issue identification” or “scoping” meetings were 
planned to acquire public input. However, the public reaction to the an- 
nouncement of the two site candidates was so strong that these meetings 
were delayed until after a final site had been selected. At this point, public 
opposition so intensified that the federal government suspended the process 
and dropped the two sites from further consideration. 
The emergence of the voluntary process 
In  response to this standoff, the minister of state for forestry and mines 
appointed an independent siting process task force in December 1986 to 
develop a less confrontational site selection process. The task force was 
commissioned to focus its efforts on the development of a process for siting 
7 CAMEC’O is tiow a semi-private firm due to a joint-venture wi th  a Saskntchewan-based 
private firni. 
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a disposal facility in Ontario for the existing, ongoing and historic wastes 
in the Port Hope area and, where advantageous, for the disposal of other 
existing and ongoing low-level wastes located in the province. The main 
objective of the process was to be the voluntary identification of one or 
more host communities, each with a suitable disposal technology. 
The task force, in turn, suggested that a process driven by ”social” rather 
than “technical” criteria be applied to resolve the low-level radioactive 
waste disposal problem. In many respects, the successful experience of 
siting a comprehensive hazardous waste disposal facility in Alberta in the 
mid-1980s became a model for the task force as it rethought the process of 
low-level radioactive waste disposal facility siting. This new process, pro- 
posed in a 1987 task force report entitled ”Opting for Cooperation,” drew 
heavily on the Alberta hazardous waste process and, in the words of one 
task force member, “built on the mistakes [Alberta] made.” The task force 
was highly critical of the AECB for allowing technical criteria to drive the 
previous selection process and thereby failing to consult with affected 
communities until site selection was effectively completed. Not only had the 
AECB relied heavily on technical rather than social criteria in its siting 
endeavours, according to the task force, but it also insisted that low-level 
radioactive waste be disposed of through land burial rather than stored or 
handled through other methods. 
Given these concerns, the task force strongly recommended that a new 
siting process be established wherein potential volunteer communities 
would have the opportunity to learn about the problems of LLRW manage- 
ment as well as the possible payoffs if they decided to accept a site. It was 
the task force’s position that volunteer communities should be free to opt 
out at any point in the exploratory phases of the process. Those deciding to 
proceed would become full partners in making decisions on all relevant 
matters. As a result, site selection and design, type of disposal technology, 
and impact management, along with other important features, were left 
open to negotiation rather than being imposed from on high by authorities. 
Finally, this cooperative/consultative process would not only guarantee the 
health and safety of a volunteer community’s citizens, but equity payments 
would assure that the community would be better off in economic terms 
after site construction was completed than it had been before. These provi- 
sions were not only a dramatic departure from prior LLRW siting efforts in 
Canada and the United States but they also featured many of the key 
components for successful siting, including voluntarism and comprehensive- 
ness, so crucial to the Alberta and related cases in hazardous waste. 
Implementing the voluntary process 
The 1987 release of the task force report led to efforts to refine and 
ultimately to implement the new siting process. On 30 September 1988 the 
minister of energy, mines and resources appointed a new siting task force 
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(SrF) to implement the first three phases of the voluntary approach to siting. 
The second “opting for cooperation” task force was asked to refine a five- 
phase siting process that considered the role of potential volunteer com- 
munities, a tentative discussion of disposal and storage options, the terms 
of reference for negotiation with local communities, and detailed cost 
estimates of implementation. Given the high levels of interest generated by 
the process, the new STF was give twenty-three months to complete its 
work. 
Besides trying to clarify a few matters concerning site suitability and 
alternative technical options for potential host communities, some elements 
of the consultative process, particularly as they concern community liaison 
groups (CLG), had to be addressed. First of all, it was decided that all CLG 
ineetings should be open to the public, despite the absence of American-like 
regulations that mandate such openness. Second, depending upon the 
response of those attending the meetings, a CLG could decide to opt out of 
the process at any time. Furthermore, a Community could decide to receive 
newly generated, as well as historic, radioactive wastes, even if the amounts 
would be relatively small and it would thereby be only a part of a larger 
waste management solution.’ 
While various guidelines and criteria were being established by the sn-, 
consultations began with regions and communities. In November 1988 
exploratory letters were sent to 850 communities. Four months later, follow- 
up letters were sent to invite two representatives from each community to 
attend one of eight regional information meeting. At these meetings, com- 
munity representatives were informed of tlie need for improved manage- 
ment of LLRW, tlie process principles already established, and some of the 
safeguards available to those interested in pursuing the process. Community 
representatives, in turn, asked about how communities would be consulted, 
how they would be defined in the first place (some contiguous communities 
were interested and wanted to proceed together), and how their CLGS, if 
formed, would measure community acceptance. They asked, furthermore, 
8 Government o f  Canada, Minister of Eiiergv, Mines and Resources, Opirig j%r Cooperczticiii: Tltc 
Firsf Phiws (Ottawa’ MEMII, lW)), p. 9. 
9 In addition to these and related guidelines, i t  was felt that tentative site elimination criteria 
had to be establishd. In Level One if just o w  criterion was met, the site would be eliminated; 
in 1,evel Ttvo, one of the criteria could be present and tlie site wwuld not be immecliately 
eliminated. Individual communities could add further criteria i f  they wished. Five Level One 
rriteria were established: resources identified by the Ministry of Natural Resources as requiring 
protection; federal or  provincial pirks,  existing or proposed; natural areas (wildlife, wetlands); 
tinstable lands (flood, fault, earthquakes); and archaeological, historic o r  cultural resmirces. 
After modest revisions suggested by CLGs in January 1990, by February and March the 
toiirteen communities meeting with the STF agreed to the reasoiiaPleness of these criteria. 
f Iowever, they were given the option of defining and ranking them through their CLG’s in 
ways that they deemed appropriate t o  local circumstances. 
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about the characteristics of and the hazards associated with LLRW, the dan- 
gers involved in transporting LLRW to their communities, the ongoing prob- 
lems associated with managing such a facility, the type and number of jobs 
available to local citizens if a facility were built, and the impact on tourism. 
After the regional consultations, twenty-six communities requested addi- 
tional meetings and/or information. Between the regional meetings and 
follow-up informational sessions held by the STF, five communities dropped 
out. An additional seven withdrew after the informational sessions, leaving 
fourteen to enter the next phase of the process. At this point, the remaining 
communities created their CLGS. Various formal and informal contacts, 
including ads in local newspapers, were used to create tentative lists. The 
STF staff called those listed to see if they met the criteria. A final list was 
printed in newspapers to allow a two-week comment period regarding the 
representativeness of the list. By the end of November 1989, ten CLGS were 
formed. An additional one was completed in January 1990, followed by one 
more in March and the last two in April. By request of the local councils, 
the STF had taken responsibility for selecting CLG members. 
As this process unfolded, the advantages of a voluntary over a top-down 
process became clear. In the voluntary process with which the STF has 
experimented, the typical kind of NIMBY confrontation has not occurred. To 
the contrary, the various CLGs networked; in other words, they shared 
information and ideas and learned from each other’s experience, as 
exemplified by the January 1990 Thunder Bay meeting of chairs and 
facilitators of CLGs. 
The results of extensive consultation varied considerably within com- 
munities, between them and the STF, and between the communities and 
outside experts that the former had selected. In Manitouwadge, Ear Falls, 
Red Lake, Atikokan, Mattice-Val Cote and Upsala, both the CLGS and the 
local councils rejected further consideration of hosting a site. The CLGS of 
the United Townships of Rolph, Buchanan, Wylie, and McKay and of the 
Townships of Head, Clara, and Maria declined to continue. The CLGS of 
Deep River, Hornepayne, and Chalk River chose to withdraw, but their 
respective councils approved movement into the next phase. In contrast, the 
Elliot Lake and James Township CLGS wanted to continue, but their 
respective councils refused. 
The concerns of those communities that opted out were familiar: the 
potential health risks, and the risks to ground and surface water, were 
perceived to be too high, with a baseline health study considered absolutely 
essential before proceeding; the potential negative impacts on economic 
development and tourism were believed to be too severe; the potential 
transportation risks and effects were also thought to be too great; finally, 
local citizens were not convinced of the long-term integrity of the tech- 
nology needed to manage LLRW. 
Although these constituted the biggest concerns, others involved a lack 
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of trust in the federal government's willingness to pay for compensation 
and to establish a well-managed facility, as well as a continuing distrust of 
the AECB. The AECB clearly lacked the public credibility that the crown 
corporations had developed for hazardous waste in Alberta and Manitoba. 
There was concern that, were a community to accept LLRW, other sorts of 
waste, including high-level radioactive materials or hazardous wastes, 
would ultimately migrate there for disposal.'" These fears were exacerbated 
by Ontario's extremely controversial efforts to locate sites for disposal of 
hazardous and solid wastes in the 1980s and 1990s." In both of these cases, 
technical, top-down approaches to facility siting have led to the familiar 
outcome of gridlock. In hazardous waste facility siting, for example, the 
province has devoted inore than twelve years and spent more than $100 
million in attempting to impose a facility on a highly reluctant Ontario 
community, with no final agreement yet attained. 
Possible site volunteers 
These withdrawals did not constitute the end of tlie voluntary siting pro- 
cess. Despite the concerns that prompted a number of CLCS or councils to 
opt out, several communities remained interested in the siting process and 
continued deliberations with STF officials through 1994. Moreover, one 
source community was interested in cleaning up LLRW located within its 
own boundaries. 
Among the potential volunteer communities, the Deep River council (a 
neighbour of the Chalk River facilities of AECI.) chose to proceed after its 
C'K; said no for four cluster communities. These Communities are located in 
northeastern Ontario, with Ottawa 115 kilometres to the south, and have a 
combined population of approximately 3,800. The two major concerns of the 
citizenry involved the desire that the historic wastes of the Port Hope area 
be managed there before being moved anywhere, and the concern that an 
accident or spill could occur if LLRW were transported tlirough surrounding 
areas. The Deep River council agreed to continue tlie process, subject to the 
following provisos: given the risks and costs of transportation, siting a new 
facility where it is now located would be tlie best option; that any waste 
relocated to Deep River should be transported hy rail with the material 
stored in suitable containers; and that, during or at the end of Phase Four, 
a referendum should be held concerning whether or not to continue the 
process, with any associated costs to be paid for by the government. Chalk 
River agreed to go along with the Deep River council. Since there are no 
sites in Chalk River, it seems to want to be part of the process to protect its 
interests. 
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Technical studies are proceeding at Deep River and a working group has 
been formed, consisting of CLG and STF members as well as representatives 
of relevant provincial and federal ministries, to develop criteria for matching 
sites with technologies. Much of their attention has focused on two pre- 
ferred sites, one below and one above ground, which were announced on 
20 July 1994. These sites are located on some four thousand hectares in the 
southeast portion of Deep River. Geraldton, a community of 2,900 residents 
located the farthest west of all the potential sites, approximately forty-five 
kilometres northeast of Thunder Bay, was intrigued by the process, given 
the project’s potential contribution to economic diversification, but its local 
council withdrew before a referendum scheduled for November 1994 could 
take place. Two problems became interwoven in producing the with- 
drawal - annexation of land intended for a facility and political opposition. 
The Ontario Municipal Board ultimately approved the necessary township 
annexations, but only after administrative delays extended the process from 
the anticipated three months to one year. Given this delay, the CLG and 
council had only eight months to complete all relevant technical work prior 
to the November referendum, as an opposition group known as Stop the 
Ongoing Process (STOP) had successfully pressured to move the vote from 
March 1995 to the prior November. This meant that the technical work 
could not be completed in time for the referendum, the STF had to certify 
that this basic deadline would go unmet, and the CLG asked the local 
council to opt out, which it did. 
In addition to the potential volunteer communities, some source com- 
munities decided to proceed to the next phase as well. Port Hope, located 
forty-five kilometres east of Toronto with a population of 10,300 residents, 
has been most active among communities in this category, although the 
local council has never passed a resolution expressing interest in partici- 
pating as a volunteer community. Its citizens want, primarily, to find a 
permanent site for the wastes deposited within town boundaries and secure 
restoration of its badly contaminated harbour in the process. Furthermore, 
they want to play a major role in the cleanup and hope to do this by having 
their CLG stay in operation until the process is over. To fulfill its role, it 
seeks to be empowered to hire consultants and contract for studies as 
necessary. In short, the Port Hope community, through its CLG, hopes to 
participate in the establishment of criteria for selecting a site, in the cleanup 
of old sites, and in the decision regarding which wastes will be moved from 
the old to new sites. In October 1992 the Port Hope council passed a 
resolution expressing a willingness to continue negotiations but emphasizing 
key conditions, such as components of the compensation package. 
Construction of a new harbour for Port Hope, however, has become a 
central stumbling block in LLRW facility siting. The International Joint Com- 
mission has identified Port Hope harbour as among the forty-three most 
environmentally hazardous sites bordering the Great Lakes and in need of 
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immediate ”remedial action,” due to extreme contamination from LLRW and 
other toxic substances.’‘ In response, the Port Hope CI C: recommended tlut 
the harbour be included under tlie criteria to be developed jointly by the 
Port Hope CLC and the STF. It also recommended that the government of 
Canada consider creation of a new harbour in Port Hope as a deinonstration 
of its commitment to the environmental integrity of the Great Lakes. Such 
linkages could formally integrate LLRW management with the larger issues 
of sediment contamination and area-wide remediation, possibly leading to 
increased public support and greater integration of environmental manage- 
ment in this part of Ontario. However, the STF lacks authority to make such 
commitments, confining Port Hope’s likely involvement to management of 
its own, abundant, wastes. Greater integration of various aspects of the 
environmental regulatory process may be one of the greatest lessons from 
this process, as  the federal government is committed to harbour restoration 
but is not formally linked with the siting process. 
Hope Township has also remained active, although only as a source 
community. Its CLG suggested the following as an interim response. It wants 
control of how wastes are evacuated and transported from the Welcome 
I I RW site, as it is very concerned about radioactive and arsenic wastes. 
Second, since the township will be affected by decisions regarding what to 
do with its historic wastes, it should be part of the consultations that deter- 
mine where tlie new site will he located. Finally, its CLG should continue to 
function ~mti l  the process is complete. The Hope Township council went on 
record in support of this response and lias continued to examine issues such 
as assessment of soil-cleaning levels. Newcastle, a Toronto exurb with 34,100 
residents, has also continued to be involved in the process. Like other 
source communities, its involvement has been motivated in large part by its 
concern over Port Granby wastes. 
As this winnowing among possible candidates lias continued, a new task 
force was created in 1991 and 1992, and was expected to complete siting 
deliberations over four years. During this period, tlie potential volunteer 
community has begun to explore the technical, environmental, and social 
impacts of receiving wastes while source communities have begun to exam- 
ine the impact of removing wastes. Joint decision making lias been empha- 
sized, includ~ng the beginning of operational planning in the remaining 
volunteer community (Deep River) and the three remaining source commu- 
nities (Port Hope, Hope Township, and Newcastle). Although it is possible 
that this process could collapse, many observers remain optimistic as serious 
dialogue continues in multiple settings. 
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Features common with related 
siting agreements 
The signs of evolving cooperation in LLRW siting in Canada are remarkable 
given the historic opposition to siting all sorts of LLRW disposal facilities in 
both Canada and the United States. Even more so than in hazardous waste 
policy, examples of LLRW siting successes are hard to find in either nation. 
The dismal American experience is one that Canada has apparently learned 
from and chosen to avoid. Examining the poor track record of many of its 
own provinces in hazardous and solid waste facility siting, and its highly 
contentious early approach to LLRW siting, Canada undertook a significant 
reform of its siting policy in 1986. Officials chose to model their new policy 
on the successful experiment completed in Alberta in 1984, since replicated 
in Manitoba in 1992. As in these hazardous waste facility siting cases, 
several key features were present. 
First, early, extensive public education and participation efforts were 
crucial to the siting processes in Alberta and Manitoba. Such a pattern 
closely resembles the Canadian LLRW siting effort. Public information and 
participation activities were not as numerous as in the western provinces 
but were extensive and were based on the principles of voluntarism. All 
involved communities were given the option to withdraw at any point of 
the process. Moreover, they were also assured of direct input in the 
selection of technology at any facility that might be opened, a decision that 
is usually finalized by authorities in advance of any siting negotiations. 
Second, the successful siting efforts in Alberta and Manitoba further 
indicate that citizens want reassurance that they will not become a magnet 
for wastes from other provinces or states if they agree to open a new 
disposal facility. Some formal agreement to share the burden for waste 
management in a fair way was crucial in both Alberta and Manitoba. In 
turn, Canada’s LLRW siting efforts have promoted the notion of burden 
sharing in a variety of ways. Perhaps most important, siting officials have 
remained open on the ultimate number of places that will participate in 
waste management and whether they will provide waste storage or more 
“permanent” disposal. It is possible, for example, that one major facility will 
emerge but that other communities will develop more modest facilities. 
Such options simply are foreclosed in the American states or compacts, 
where there is usually an intensive search for a single site to employ a 
single disposal technology to dispose of all the wastes that are eventually 
shipped its way. 
The Canadian process has also benefited from a general sense of as- 
surance that it will not become a magnet for wastes from other parts of 
Canada. Since Ontario generates the vast majority of Canada’s LLRW, there 
is little threat of exploitation by neighbouring provinces. Moreover, officials 
have stated that any new LLRW facility will not accept waste from the 
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United States or other nations. Such a shift in position could indeed 
undermine the cooperation that has emerged thus far. 
The filial aspect of burden-sharing, combining siting efforts with ex- 
panded efforts to reduce the volume of waste being generated, has proven 
less prominent in ILLRW deliberations in either Canada or the United States 
than in the hazardous waste facility siting agreements in Alberta and 
Manitoba. Both nations have made significant strides in waste reduction in 
recent vears, but this has not formallv been incorporated into siting deliber- 
ations. By contrast, several European nations have successfully made this 
linkage central to their siting policies.’’ 
Third, compensation and safety protection were of enormous importance 
in  the successful hazardous waste facility siting cases. Canadian LLRW siting 
officials have proven extremely open to alternative siting technologies and 
varying types of compensation packages. In Port Hope, for example, the 
issue of facility siting has been directly linked with harbour dredging and 
cleanup, an action that, if completed, would offer considerable environ- 
mental and economic benefits for local residents. 
Fourth, Alberta and Manitoba were also extremely successful in devising 
new managerial partnerships to defuse concern over long-term commit- 
ments to technical and financial feasibility of new facilities. As in hazardous 
waste, many private LLRw management corporations in both Canada and 
the United States have shoddy records when it comes to maintaining high 
levels of operational proficiency and assuring fiscal commitment to facility 
operation. In many siting controversies, the questionable integrity of private 
corporations which will be responsible for facility operation scuttles any 
possibility of agreement. As we shall see, slipshod public and private 
management helped undermine an American case in which, under a volun- 
tary approach, an agreement may liave been possible. 
Both Alberta and Manitoba devised public-private partnerships designed 
to assuage those very reasonable concerns. Both established new crown 
corporations to be responsible for shared facility management with private 
firms that are overseen by provincial regulatory authorities. In Canadian 
I-LRW, the governmental role will be similarly large and enduring in any 
new storage or disposal facilities. Indeed, the Canadian Siting Task Force 
has proven unusually successful at winning public trust and facilitating 
genuine dialogue over siting options in multiple communities. It has helped 
overcome understandable public reservations about both Eldorado and the 
AECB, a pair of public entities with long and somewhat controversial 
records. 
These four broad features - public participation, burden-sharing, com- 
pensation and protection, and a credible governmental role in siting and 
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facility management - appear to have contributed to the evolution of coop- 
eration in Canadian LLRW management, much as they have in prior 
hazardous waste facility siting agreements. We now turn to the American 
case, where traditional siting approaches have prevailed and faced pre- 
dictable, NIMBY-type outcomes, but some experimentation with a more 
voluntary approach offers some hope. 
The evolution of American LLRW 
management 
The 1980 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act and its 1985 amendments 
represent a significant departure from traditional American approaches to 
LLRW that have been dominated by the federal government. They featured 
a series of federal mandates and incentives that encouraged individual 
states to form multi-state compacts to manage LLRW.'* This legislation 
retains federal authority for setting safety standards and orchestrates a 
system of timetables, incentives, and penalties related to compact creation. 
As is the case with many other interstate compacts, the radioactive waste 
compacts must be approved by Congress before becoming official. 
However, this legislation also delegates a significant degree of subnational 
authority. It leaves to individual states the decisions concerning the other 
states (if any) with which they will share compact responsibilities, how they 
will design and implement their siting processes, and what methods they 
will use for disposal. Among the powerful incentives that the federal 
government provides to states to enter into compacts rather than manage 
waste on a solo basis is that those states that belong to a congressionally 
approved compact have the authority to exclude wastes from other states, 
whereas independent states cannot restrict such waste importation. 
The compact approach has thus represented a unique federal government 
effort to delegate regulatory authority to individual states or clusters of 
them. Its enactment was driven in large part by the efforts of the governors 
of Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington. Their respective states con- 
tained the only three waste disposal sites that continued to operate in the 
nation after three other sites closed in the late 1970s. The governors' threat 
to restrict access to these sites prodded Congress to accept the compact 
approach that was developed by the National Governors Ass~ciation.'~ 
14 The idea of such regional approaches to pressing problems, including environmental ones, 
has been widely used in tlie United States. See Martha Derthick, Between State and Natioiz: 
Regioiznl Orgunizntioizs of tlie Uiiited States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974). On 
regional approaches to environmental management in Canada, see M. Paul Brown, "Environ- 
mental Canada and the Pursuit of Administrative Decentralization," CANADIAN PUBLIC 
15 On the early history of this legislation, see E. William Colglazer, Jr., ed., The Politics of 
Nuclear Waste (New York: Perganion, 1982); Richard C. Kearney and Robert B. Garey, "Ameri- 
can Federalism and tlie Management of Radioactive Wastes," Public Administration Reoiau 42, 
no. 1 (January/February 1983, pp. 12-24. 
ADMINISTRATION 29 (1986), pp. 218-236. 
659 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA 
BARRY G. RABE,  \YILLIAM C. GUNDERSON, PETER T. HARBAGE 
The success of the compacts was to be measured by their ability to  meet 
a series of federally established milestones that anticipated a fully function- 
ing system of sites by 1993. These timetables were delayed and altered 
somewhat in tlie 1985 amendments, when it became obvious that the initial 
legislation had been too ambitious. Select portions of this process were 
invalidated by a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision. In particular, this 
decision argued that i t  was unconstitutional to require states to ”take title” 
t o  all wastes after specified deadlines.” However, much of the remaining 
structure was not overturned and, at least in some cases, the siting process 
continues. 
All of these complicated factors were designed to promote policy coor- 
dination and facilitate long-term support for waste disposal agreements. 
They operated on the assumption that states and compact regions would 
perceive long-run adxrantages from entering into compacts and accepting 
surcharge rebates and other compensatory benefits. In this process, it was 
assumed, they would successfully override political resistance to facility 
siting. This approach hinged, in  many respects, on a presumption that 
economic compensation alone would serve as a reliable lubricant of siting 
conflict . 
The compact approach has enjoyed one degree of success, in that forty- 
two states have entered into a total of nine congressionally approved com- 
pacts. The fifteen states which belong to the two compacts that feature 
disposal facilities in continued operation (in South Carolina and Wash- 
ington) are set for the near future, having secure facility access and the 
ability to exclude out-of-compact wastes if they so choose. For the remaining 
states m d  territories, however, the compact approach has largely been a 
nightmare. N o  new siting agreements have been reached in any state or 
compact and none are in sight in the near future. Consequently, many 
states, such as Michigan, are forced to store LLliW a t  more than fifty sites 
around tlie state; many of these sites were never intended for long-term 
storagci or disposal and they pose significant safety and security problems. 
Increasingly, L.LRW that cannot be shipped to South Carolina or Washington 
must be stored in this fashion, either at the site of nuclear power plants, 
hospitals, medical research institutes, or other facilities that generate some 
amount of 1.1.17W. South Carolina has allowed a sinall amount of LLRW 
imports from stcites demonstrating some continued commitment to resolving 
their own waste disposal problems, imposing an increasingly steep sur- 
charge in  the process. There is, however, no assurance as to how long this 
export option will remain available, as the state is free to close it at any 
I h  Nrw York v. LIiirtcil S ~ S  ( 1  12 S. Ct. 2.108, 19Y2). For a useful analysis of this case and  it5 
policy ramifications, see Richard C. Keariiey, “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: 
Fnvircinnicntal Policy, Federaltsnt, and New York,“ Pihliirs: 7 1 1 c  \ o i ~ r t i d  C J ~  F e d ~ ~ m l i s v i  23, 110. 3 
(Siininicr I”?), pp. 57-73. 
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time. In turn, those states perceived as not making a reasonable commitment 
to waste management have been completely cut off from further access to 
the facility. 
The siting approach most commonly used in the states and compacts has 
eschewed broad public participation and a comprehensive waste manage- 
ment process in favour of the traditional top-down approach driven by 
technical criteria. In Connecticut, for example, the state's Hazardous Waste 
Management Service used such criteria to determine that three towns were 
its preferred candidates for a facility that would manage LLRW from 
Connecticut and New Jersey, its Northeast Compact partner. There had been 
no prior consultation with these communities and no prior warning that 
they would be a finalist. As an elected official of one of these areas ex- 
plained after learning the news, "1'11 never forget it. I was in shock. I had 
to sit down for a minute." 
Residents of the other two potential host communities responded simi- 
larly, but then wasted little time in taking vigorous collective action against 
the proposal. Public meetings were finally held, but these became rallying 
events for opponents. Several interviewees recalled that, at one of these 
meetings, an official of the Management Service said, in essence, that "the 
site will go in one of these areas, and you cannot stop it." However, after 
months of NIMBY opposition, the proposals were withdrawn, leaving the 
siting process in Connecticut and New Jersey up for grabs. LLRW is no small 
issue in these states, as combined they produce approximately 7 per cent of 
the nation's total new LLRW generated each year. 
Michigan exercised similar diplomacy and participatory skills in ad- 
vancing its siting plans. The state grudgingly agreed to become the siting 
host for the seven-state Midwest Compact in 1986 and did receive consid- 
erable financial support through the rebates made available to the compact 
from the federal government. But like Connecticut, Michigan relied on 
technical criteria in the absence of public participation in its process of 
selecting three sites. In October 1989 three rural areas scattered about the 
state were informed, by mail, that they were the finalists. None were at  all 
aware that they were under consideration for managing LLRW from around 
the midwest region. As one town supervisor recalled, "I first found out 
when the press called to ask me how I felt about all of this. It was really 
upsetting to find out that way." From this point, the Michigan siting 
process almost perfectly paralleled the Connecticut experience. After nearly 
two years of contentious public meetings and NIMBY opposition, the state 
withdrew the three sites from further consideration. However, as it failed 
to develop any alternative siting process, it was ousted from continued 
participation in the Midwest Compact, leaving it on its own to find a 
siting solution and cut off from any further access to the South Carolina 
facility. 
Other compacts and states have struggled in somewhat similar fashion, 
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although a few have tried to incorporate some of tlie conditions that have 
proven so crucial to the cooperation emerging over Ontario LLRW siting and 
in the earlier examples of successful hazardous waste facility siting. Among 
these, the Central Compact and its host state, Nebraska, remains the closest 
American counterpart to this alternative approach. It emphasized a number 
of the key themes discussed in tlie Ontario case and made far more progress 
toward a cooperative solution than other states and compacts, although its 
siting process faced some serious problems and its fate remains uncertain. 
An attempt at voluntarism: the case 
of Nebraska 
Between 1981 and 1987 Nebraska followed much the same process as had 
Connecticut and Michigan. The state was negotiating its status in a compact, 
and in March 1982 the Central Compact was formed. In addition to 
Nebraska, the compact included Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, and 
Oklahoma, which collectively generates about 9 per cent of tlie nation’s 
LLRW each year. Then, beginning in 1986, tlie Nebraska Department of 
Environmental Control drafted several regulations regarding the cons- 
truction of a I LRW facility. Several public hearings were held on tlie compact 
and the facility regulations but few citizens attended the meetings. In June 
1987 the compact selected a private firm, US Ecology, to develop, construct, 
and operate the Central Compact facility. 
At this point, the Nebraska case began to diverge from the ones in 
Connecticut and Michigan. Nebraska was chosen as the compact’s host state 
in 1988. This stimulated a citizens’ group, Nebraskans for the Right to Vote, 
to gather the more than 150,000 signatures necessary to hold an initiative 
vote on whether or not the state should remain in the compact. Known as 
Initiative 402, 69 per cent of participating voters supported continued coni- 
pact involvenient in November 1988. The initiative proved a major statewide 
issue and several groups on both sides of tlie question organized and 
advanced their respective cases. The questions raised during the campaign 
focused not on site-specific issues, but on larger concerns, such as whether 
or not Nebraska’s waste generators would have to shut down if Nebraska 
rejected the possibility of hosting a site. 
The initiative campaign overlapped with the initiation of US Ecology and 
Nebraska’s public participation efforts in April 1988. The Nebraska Citizens’ 
Advisory Committee (NCAC) and the Nebraska League of Women Voters 
both played important roles in this process, supplementing related efforts 
of US Ecology. The committee was established by US Ecology and was 
designed to reflect diverse constituencies, as it included representatives of 
farming, ranching, business, environmental, and natural resource interests. 
I t  was intended to gather public opinion but also to play a significant role 
in  advising US Ecology on key siting and facility design issues. Over a 
seven-month period the committee held six public meetings, at which tlie 
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public was encouraged to give their input on any aspect of the siting 
program. At least one meeting was held in each major region of the state. 
The League of Women Voters, in turn, sponsored two series of public 
workshops in 1988. The first series, held in May, involved US Ecology 
presentations of the siting criteria that were going to be used. Citizens were 
encouraged to give their input about the appropriateness of the proposed 
criteria. The second series featured a US Ecology presentation of the pro- 
posed facility design and, again, sought public suggestions. There were five 
workshops in each of these two series, generating literally thousands of 
comments and suggestions from all around the state. Both site criteria and 
facility design plans were changed in response to concerns raised in these 
meetings. 
Despite the significant involvement of the League of Women Voters, US 
Ecology played the most important role in the public participation process. 
As these other efforts were taking place, it mailed out invitations to each 
Nebraska municipality, county board, chamber of commerce, and natural 
resource district and asked them if they were interested in the possibility of 
hosting a facility. Using the same voluntary philosophy successful in other 
siting cases, the firm made clear that it would not enter an area for site 
testing unless invited in by local authorities. Moreover, an initial positive 
response was not binding; communities were told that they could withdraw 
at any time they wished. 
In response, fifty-two municipal governments and twenty counties ex- 
pressed interest in exploring the possibility of hosting a facility. Within 
these fifty-two communities, 11 1 “potential siting areas” (PSAs) were identi- 
fied by US Ecology. Such a response was astounding given the pattern of 
near-immediate rejection of siting proposals in virtually all other states and 
compacts. As the process continued, some of these candidates withdrew, 
either for political or geological reasons, but twenty-seven I’SAs in eleven 
different counties remained involved. Such a pattern was similar, in many 
respects, to the winnowing that occurred among potential volunteer sites in 
hazardous waste in Alberta and Manitoba and is occurring in LLRW in 
Ontario. 
But at this point the process began to sour. Rather than pursue continued 
public dialogue with all possible candidates, as in Ontario, the Central 
Compact moved very quickly to narrow the field and attempt to reach an 
agreement in short order. Their pace was driven in part by Nebraska law, 
which called for site announcement by 1 January 1989, one year ahead of 
the timetable in the federal legislation. The NCAC used a ”blind” format 
involving technical information on remaining areas to select three of them 
for further examination and, in the process, eliminate all other possible 
candidates. The NCAC chose rural sites in Boyd, Nemaha, and Nuckolls 
counties and US Ecology designated specific areas within these counties as 
its finalists on 18 January 1989. This selection was little more than three 
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months after the statewide referendum, reflecting the extremely fast pace of 
site selection after the initial public participation efforts. Hence, there was 
little opportunity for the sorts of extended discussions and review of 
multiple candidates so crucial to the other siting agreements. 
Generous compensation packages began to be offered at this point, as 
called for in the authorizing legislation, providing a steady flow of new, 
largely unrestricted income to each of the three county finalists. In 1989, for 
example, each of the three final counties received $100,000. US Ecology 
completed concurrent investigations at the three sites but focused most of 
its subsequent analysis on a Boyd County site, located in McCully Township 
(population 160). This township is located near the village of Butte 
(popul‘ttion 540), upon which it is dependent for all educational and fire 
protection services. US Ecology was attracted to the Butte site for technical 
reasons as  well as its knowledge that it had strong support for the facility 
from the Butte Board of Commissioners, which had twice passed resolutions 
supportive of liostiiig the facility. US Ecology announced on 37 December 
1989 that the Butte site had been selected as the preferred host area, closing 
its information office and related efforts in Nuckolls and Nemaha counties 
within ‘3 few months. 
The selection of this site, however, was a serious blunder that under- 
miiicd the public trust and dialogue that had been developed to that point. 
Despite the support of Butte elected officials and the neighbouring com- 
munities of Anoka and Lynch, there were numerous warning signs that any 
effort to attempt to impose a siting decision in Boyd County would be ill- 
fated. One day prior to the January 1989 announcement that a Boyd County 
site would be onc of tlircc finalists, the Boyd County Board of Corninis- 
sioners had voted to rescind their invitation to US Ecology. In turn, neigh- 
bouring communities of Spencer (population 645, located 20 kilometres east 
of Butte) and Naper (population 171, located twenty kilometres west of 
Butte) had registered strong opposition in advance of the January announce- 
ment. Butte, Spencer, and Napcr have a long-standing history of animosity 
toward one another, with a series of skirmishes over the placement of 
railroads, highways, the county fair, and the county seat. Some of these 
battles date back to the nineteenth century, but the tensions endure through 
the 199Os, only inflamed further by the LLRW proposal. Moreover, there is 
considerable tension among the communities over a proposed merger of the 
Butte and Spencer high schools, which would mean that one of these 
communities will soon lose its secondary school. There is also resentment 
over division of the compensation package, as Butte has received $300,000 
in virtually unrestricted funds for each of the past several years, while its 
respective neighhours have received little if any financial support. Finally, 
strong grass-roots organization, Save Boyd County, liad already formed 
to opposc’ the facility before US Ecology liad chosen to press ahead, and 
would later seek advice from national anti-nuclear groups on civil dis- 
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obedience and harassment tactics. In short, Boyd County hardly seemed an 
auspicious place to pursue siting, especially when opposition was already 
mounting and other volunteer candidates had expressed interest in the 
possibility of hosting a facility. 
The selection of Butte was viewed by many as a fundamental break of US 
Ecology's earlier promise to only pursue siting where a genuine volunteer 
commitment was evident. In fact, as late as December 1988 a US Ecology 
vice-president had reassured the Boyd County commissioners that the firm 
would leave if at any future point local citizens wanted them to do so. 
Despite the strong opposition, a group of Butte citizens, People for Progress, 
have continued to rally support for the site and claim to have five hundred 
supporters throughout the county. Since the siting process began, there have 
been two Village of Butte Board of Commissioners elections, and on both 
occasions candidates supportive of the site have been elected or re-elected. 
Butte's and McCully Township's elected county board representatives have 
continued to support the site. However, all subsequent US Ecology efforts 
to hold public meetings and discussions of the proposal have proven 
extremely divisive, leaving the future of the siting proposal for Butte in 
near-total disarray. The credibility of US Ecology has been badly damaged, 
in Boyd County and the remainder of Nebraska, by this episode, making it 
an unlikely candidate to lead any resumption of the voluntary siting pro- 
cess. "I don't think that US Ecology could hold another meeting in [Boyd 
County]," noted one siting opponent. "They would just get run out on a 
rail." 
This failure should not, however, mar the considerable early achievements 
of the Nebraska siting process. Far more so than any other compact, exten- 
sive efforts were made to involve the public. Much to its credit, this volun- 
tary process attracted numerous potential participants. It is impossible to 
know whether selection of another finalist community, or keeping open 
options for numerous potential communities, might have led to a different 
outcome. Nonetheless, the compact's determination to proceed rapidly to a 
siting decision, as dictated by Nebraska legislation, and US Ecology's 
adamant choice of Butte in the face of numerous warning signs of conflict, 
should not lead to rejection of the Nebraska case as typical of siting failure. 
At least in the stages leading up to site selection, the Nebraska case bears 
a good deal of resemblance to the Ontario LLRW case and those in hazardous 
waste discussed earlier. Moreover, there is a very real possibility of reviving 
the siting process, given continued support for a site by residents of Butte, 
Anoka, and Lynch. 
Conclusions 
The Ontario LLRW siting case indicates that many of the siting lessons drawn 
from hazardous waste facility siting can be applied with some success to the 
contentious issue of radioactive waste disposal. In turn, the American 
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experience in L.1.RW generally confirms the overall pattern of failed siting in 
l~azardous waste, although the Nebraska case suggests a possibility of 
implementing some version of the voluntary approach in the United States. 
In recent months some states and cornpacts have begun to explore this 
approach, most notably Connecticut, which has chosen to revise its siting 
efforts in this way.“ However, it remains unclear whether such states will 
merely extend a general invitation for volunteers, or instead attempt to 
develop the more comprehensive process necessary to enhance the prospects 
of extended dialogue over siting options and, in turn, increase the likelihood 
of siting agreements. Far from foolproof, the voluntary approach, in all its 
fxets, does offer a fresh alternative to prevailing approaches to contro- 
versial facilities. Beyond waste management facilities, both Canada and the 
United States have experienced increasing conflict over a wide array of 
siting efforts, including proposed facilities for drug and alcohol rehabili- 
tation, nursing homes and hospices, public housing, and air and rail trans- 
port. National and subnational governments in both nations have generally 
groped for strategies that can foster serious public dialogue over siting 
options and lead to cooperation in final siting decisions. Both governmental 
and private sector officials in a wide array of policy areas plagued by 
NIMBY-type reaction may well benefit froin careful consideration of these 
more successful efforts in  waste facility siting. 
1: TIiis  shitt in policy ~ v a s  appro\,ed by the Connecticut legislature in April 19543. I t  proposed 
c\terisi\,e public participation prwisions combined with financial support to potential volun- 
tvci-5;. Sce Ricliard C. Kearney a n d  An& A.  Smith, ”The Low Level Radioactive Waste Siting 
I’rocei5 in Coniiecticiit: Anatomy of a Failure,” Paper presented at the 1993 annual nieeting of 
the Atiit?ric,in Society tor I’uhlir Administratictn, Sail  Francisco. 
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